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Introduction
Fake news is just the beginning. Misinformation has graduated to
“deepfake media”: advanced and realistic audiovisual communications
specifically designed to deceive and inflict harm. Deepfake media created
and distributed in the leadup to an election or those that attempt to influence
the American electorate present an especially concerning threat to the
integrity of our democratic election system. The issue of political deepfakes
that attempt to influence voters is particularly salient now in the wake of the
2020 election as political polarization accelerates.1
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law J.D. Candidate 2022. I offer my
sincerest thanks to Professor Zachary Price for his invaluable encouragement and overall guidance
[61]
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A deepfake video has the potential to confuse voters, incite violent
action, influence confidence in a candidate, and manipulate voters’
decisions. As artificial intelligence technology advances, manipulated
media will become more difficult to detect and distinguish from unaltered
media.2 Additionally, manipulated media has the potential to create lasting,
visceral impressions in voters’ minds. However, any regulation of deepfake
media must be reconciled with one of America’s most cherished rights: the
First Amendment freedom of expression. Although Congress has previously
attempted to pass legislation that imposes penalties, categorical bans, or
require disclosure of manipulated media, these efforts have largely been
unsuccessful.3 Moreover, copyright law, privacy torts, and defamation
actions have been largely ineffectual.4
Political deepfakes are an example of why First Amendment doctrine
should adapt to protect against new threats. The harm to society inflicted by
political deepfakes are a symptom of a larger problem: the U.S. Supreme
Court has so far taken a rigid, hardline approach that will result in harm to
our cherished democratic society. This Note argues that the time has finally
come for the Supreme Court to evolve from their stubborn First Amendment
doctrine in order to adequately protect the integrity of the electoral process
that is essential for democracy.
This Note will propose that the Court should expand First Amendment
doctrine to include a new, unprotected category specifically for political
deepfakes and resultant harm. Part I will introduce the problem that political
deepfakes pose for the stability of America’s democracy and discuss current
and proposed legislation. Part II will evaluate the recent trends in the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and outline the challenges
of regulation under the First Amendment. Part III will analyze scholarly
proposals and recommend the establishment of a new unprotected category
or at least a more reasonable judicial approach to evolving technologies.
Political deepfakes present a greater threat to democracy than fake news
because they are technologically superior. As technology advances, First
throughout the preparation of this Note. I am grateful to my family, and especially my parents, for
their endless support. Additional thanks are owed to Professor Wendy Hill for her mentorship in
legal writing and to the entire editorial staff at Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly.
1. John Koetsier, Fake Video Election? Deepfake Videos ‘Grew 20X’ Since 2019, FORBES
(Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/09/09/fake-videoelection-deepfake-videos-grew-20x-since-2019/?sh=3d88fc47148c (documenting the recent
increase in political deepfake media).
2. Drew Harwell, Top AI Researchers Race to Detect ‘Deepfake’ Videos: ‘We Are
Outgunned’, WASH. POST (June 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/
06/12/top-ai-researchers-race-detect-deepfake-videos-we-are-outgunned/ (recognizing the
negative effect online information can have on consumer confidence).
3. H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/housebill/3230.
4. Shannon Reid, Comment, The Deepfake Dilemma: Reconciling Privacy And First
Amendment Protections, 23 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 209, 220 (2021).
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Amendment doctrine should adapt to protect essential governmental
functions that are valued even more than the freedom of expression.

I. Political Deepfake Problems Outstrip Current Solutions
A. The Danger of Manipulated Media

Since the proliferation of “fake news” in the 2016 election, academics
and scholars have grown increasingly concerned with the rise in political
polarization.5 While polarization can be beneficial to a democracy, this
extreme acceleration can be harmful if animosity scales too quickly.
Political deepfakes are the latest, most extreme kind of fake news media that
attempt to directly affect the political electorate.
Deepfakes are manipulated media that have been edited with deep
learning artificial intelligence to replace a person’s likeness without their
permission.6 The vast majority of deepfake media that has been detected
online is pornographic in nature, but deepfake video or audio files have the
potential to cause defamatory, economic, and political harm as well.7 The
technology used to create a deepfake is readily available to anyone with a
computer, specialized software system, or specialized application.8 As a
result, deepfakes are becoming more pervasive in American society as
everyone from computer engineers to cheerleader moms realize they are
capable of manipulating media to their advantage.9
Some of the most problematic types of deepfakes are political in nature.
Just in the past few years, manipulated videos of “Nancy Pelosi,” “Barack
Obama,” “Donald Trump,” and Mark Zuckerberg have gone viral.10 For
example, one video of “Nancy Pelosi” was altered in order to make it appear
that she was slurring her words to suggest a state of intoxication. 11
Additionally, a public service announcement by “President Barack Obama”
5. Mike Wendling, The (Almost) Complete History of ‘Fake News’, BBC TRENDING (Jan.
22, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-42724320.
6. Ian Sample, What Are Deepfakes - and How Can You Spot Them?, THE GUARDIAN (Jan.
13, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/13/what-are-deepfakes-and-howcan-you-spot-them (outlining common characteristics of deepfake media content).
7. Dave Johnson, What is a Deepfake? Everything You Need to Know About the AI-powered
Fake Media, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-deepfake
(explaining the basic components of deepfake media).
8. Id.
9. Andrew Court, Cheerleader Mom is Arrested for Creating ‘Deepfake’ Images and Videos
Showing Her Daughter’s Rivals ‘Naked, Drinking and Smoking’ in a Bid to Have Them Kicked Off
the Team, DAILYMAIL.COM (Mar. 13, 2021), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article9359823/
Cheerleader-mom-created-deepfake-images-daughters-rivals-naked-drinking-smoking.html
(reporting damage caused by a pornographic deepfake video).
10. Joseph Foley, 14 Deepfake Examples That Terrified and Amused the Internet,
CREATIVEBLOQ.COM (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.creativebloq.com/features/deepfake-examples
(listing examples of damaging deepfake videos).
11. Id.
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shows his likeness edited to include gestures and audio that never existed.12
Some of the most harmful or destabilizing media sources are political
deepfakes that target politicians or those that are deployed during an election
campaign. Although lawmakers at the federal and state levels have
attempted to enact legislation to regulate the creation and distribution of
deepfake media, these attempts have been largely unsuccessful.
The potential consequences of deepfake technology interfering with the
political process are alarming. For instance, a deepfake video could falsely
depict a candidate committing a criminal or morally reprehensible act in the
lead up to an election. A deepfake audio file could be manipulated to mislead
the electorate into believing that the candidate used a racial slur. Further,
deepfake technology that facilitates manipulation of elections provides an
attractive opportunity to international regimes that have an interest in
American politics.
Notably, not all applications of deepfake technology are nefarious. The
film industry uses deepfake technology for various artistic projects. Further,
the Supreme Court has consistently held that parodies and political satire are
forms of protected speech.13 In reality, deepfakes are most commonly used
to inflict harm on individuals and spread suspicion and distrust in the society
at large. Deepfakes present a particular challenge to traditional avenues of
relief because it is not always possible to identify the person responsible for
the creation of the manipulated media.
According to a 2019 study conducted by Pew Research Center, 68% of
Americans acknowledge fake news or misinformation as “greatly
impact[ing] Americans’ confidence in government institutions.” 14
Furthermore, at least half of Americans believe that false information
negatively affects how people feel towards each other, and 80% believe that
action should be taken to regulate false information.15 At a time when
political polarization is at its zenith, false information is particularly
concerning because of how it can be weaponized. Recent cases predictably
reflect traditional First Amendment jurisprudence: a stubborn refusal to
recognize new categories of protected speech. As technology advances and
poses a greater threat to our society, this hard-line approach will be hard to
justify as polarization increases.
B. Present Concerns Regarding Political Speech

Addressing the problem of political deepfakes reveals the larger,
consistent problems lurking in modern First Amendment jurisprudence.
12. Id.
13. Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53–54 (1988).
14. Amy Mitchell, et al., Many Americans Say Made-Up News is a Critical Problem That
Needs To Be Fixed, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 5, 2019), https://www.journalism.org/2019/06/05/
many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/.
15. Id.
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Technology is accelerating so quickly that legislation is unable to adequately
protect against the threats manipulated media poses to the public and the
electoral process. At a time when the country is more polarized and
politically involved than ever, media manipulation poses a unique threat to
the integrity of the electoral process and democracy itself. Political
deepfakes are one of the most visceral and potentially harmful sources of
false and inflammatory media that is affecting the political electorate and
democracy.16 Deepfake media is just one example of an extreme,
unregulated fake news source that has the potential to damage public
confidence. As false media continues to evolve, it will become harder for
the Court to justify excluding extremely harmful media from regulation.
Under American constitutional law, speech regulations are subject to a
First Amendment analysis.17 Courts first determine the category in which
the regulation falls: viewpoint, content, speaker’s identity, time, place, and
manner.18 The standard of review is ultimately determined by the category
in which the regulation falls. Public officials such as political candidates do
not have a private tort remedy for false statements without actual malice due
to the Court’s ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.19 However, scholars
recognize and criticize the Court’s reluctance to expand the scope of
unprotected categories under the First Amendment.20
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court found
that the political corporate independent expenditures should not be restricted
partially because they “would not interfere with governmental functions.”21
This holding contradicted Court precedent that allowed such restrictions
when speech interfered with governmental functions.22 Notably, the Court
recognized that “it is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters
must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine
how to cast their votes.”23 The Citizens United Court held that “political
speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source
is a corporation.’”24 Further, the Citizens United Court recognized that
“[c]orporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the

16. Mitchell, supra note 14.
17. Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights As Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 40 (2018).
18. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983); see also
Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580
(2011); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802–03 (1989).
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
20. Symposium: Hate Crime V. Hate Speech: Exploring The First Amendment, Our Imperiled
Absolutist First Amendment, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 818 (2018).
21. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010).
22. Id. at 342.
23. Id. at 341.
24. Id. at 341 (quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)).
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‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the
First Amendment seeks to foster.”25
Political expression in the context of deepfake media would likely not
lose First Amendment freedom of expression under the Court’s current First
Amendment jurisprudence. Political speech is respected and guarded as
critical to a democratic society. Although political speech itself should not
lose protection, the First Amendment should adapt to protecting society
against false and manipulated political speech that has a destabilizing and
harmful impact on society. The American electorate deserves protection
against false visceral media to be adequately informed and to maintain the
integrity of the electoral system.
C. Leading Regulatory Proposals

At the federal level, the 2021 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act
(“NDAA”) instructs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
compile and publish an annual report on the harms caused by deepfakes for
the next five years.26 The report is expected to include an analysis of the
potential harm from both foreign and domestic campaign interference.27
Congress amended the NDAA to specifically include reported harm caused
by foreign and domestic campaign interference and abusive military
deepfake videos.28 Additionally, as of December 2020, the Identifying
Outputs of Generative Adversarial Networks Act requires the National
Science Foundation to research and track evolving deepfake technology.29
This Act also requires the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
establish standards related to deepfakes in the public and private sectors.30
On March 11, 2021, the Senate received H.R. 1 after it was passed by
the House of Representatives.31 Section 4421 of H.R. 1, or the For the People
Act, amends Title III of the Federal Campaign Act of 1971 to include section
325 which prohibits distribution of “materially deceptive media prior to
election.”32 Section 325 specifically provides that,
a person, political committee, or other entity shall not, within 60 days
of an election for Federal office at which a candidate for elective office
will appear on the ballot, distribute, with actual malice, materially
deceptive audio or visual media of the candidate with the intent to

25. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342–43 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783).
26. Scott Briscoe, U.S. Laws Address Deepfakes, ASIS INT’L (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.
asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/latest-news/today-in-security/2021/january/U-SLaws-Address-Deepfakes/.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. For the People Act of 2021, H.R.1, 117th Cong. (2021).
32. Id.
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injure the candidate’s reputation or to deceive a voter into voting for
or against the candidate.33
If passed by the Senate, the For the People Act will be the first federal
law to regulate the contents of deceptive video and audio media in the leadup
to an election.34 Because the law effectively targets media focused on
candidate portrayal or political speech, it will likely trigger a First
Amendment challenge. The language of H.R. 1 reflects the Court’s holding
in New York Times v. Sullivan, where the Court held that actual malice was
required for a finding of defamation against public officials.35 Although the
statute may technically pass the standard set by this case, the realistic
application of H.R. 1 would likely be ineffective in practice as discussed in
Part II.
At the state level, California and Texas are recognized as leaders in
deepfake regulation because of their specific laws targeting political and
pornographic deepfake media.36 In 2019, Texas prohibited deepfake media
targeted at elections.37 Additionally in 2019, Virginia enacted a law banning
deepfake pornography.38 Soon after, California banned the “videos, images,
or audio of politicians doctored to resemble real footage within sixty days of
an election.”39 States such as Washington, Maine, and Maryland have also
proposed deepfake election legislation as well.40 However, scholars have
grown increasingly concerned that state laws that restrict political speech
overstep First Amendment boundaries.41
One of the motivations behind California’s deepfake legislation was the
2019 viral video of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.42 The video was
manipulated to make it appear as though “Speaker Pelosi” was drunk and
slurring her words.43 Unfortunately, social media sites are unable to

33.
34.
35.
36.

For the People Act of 2021, supra note 31.
Id.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
Kathleen Ronayne, California Bans ‘Deepfakes’ Video, Audio Close to Elections,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 4, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/4db02da9c1594fd1a199ee0242
c39cc2.
37. Briscoe, supra note 26.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. H.B. 198, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020); S.B. 6513, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020), L.D.
1988, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2020).
41. S.B. 751, 86th Leg., Prior Sess. (Tex. 2019–2020); Jared Schroeder, Texas Deepfake Law
Unlikely to Survive Scrutiny of the Courts, TEXAS TRIB., (Sept. 13, 2019), https://blog.smu.edu/
opinions/2019/09/25/texas-deepfake-law-unlikely-to-survive-scrutiny-of-the-courts/.
42. Mahin Sadiq, Footage of the Democratic House Speaker Was Edited to Make Her Appear
Drunk or Unwell, in the Latest Incident Highlighting Social Media’s Struggle to Deal with
Disinformation, THE GUARDIAN (May 24, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/
2019/may/24/real-v-fake-debunking-the-drunk-nancy-pelosi-footage-video.
43. Id.
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effectively regulate deepfake media.44 Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg
conceded that the platform’s algorithm did not detect the deepfake video of
“Speaker Pelosi” quickly enough.45 Even if detection technology is able to
recognize deepfake media, it is difficult or sometimes impossible to identify
the creator of the deepfake media.
The robust concern over manipulated media and false depictions of
candidates before the 2020 election resulted in legislative action in
California.46 California State Assemblymember Marc Berman introduced
Assembly Bill 730 in 2019 in order to ban the distribution of “deceptive
audio or visual media of a candidate with the intent to injure the candidate’s
reputation or deceive a voter into voting for or against the candidate, unless
specified disclosure requirements are met.”47 Berman emphasized that the
impetus for AB 730 was the potential harm to the political electorate.48 In a
statement, Berman declared,”[d]eepfakes are a powerful and dangerous new
technology that can be weaponized to sow misinformation and discord
among an already hyper-partisan electorate.”49
Berman further emphasized that deepfakes of political candidates are
more harmful leading up to an election because “[d]eepfakes distort the truth,
making it extremely challenging to distinguish real events and actions from
fiction and fantasy. AB 730 seeks to protect voters from being tricked and
influenced by manipulated videos, audio recordings, or images before an
election.”50 In the absence of effective federal legislation, states recognize
the harm political deepfakes pose and are attempting to protect their
residents.

II. Modern First Amendment Doctrine Fails to Adequately
Protect Against Harm Incurred by Deepfakes
A. Current First Amendment Jurisprudence

The First Amendment protection of expression is unique in its scope,
integrity, and strength. In the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court has
developed a First Amendment doctrine that is highly protective of speech.
The Court has recognized that the First Amendment “‘has its fullest and most

44. Kurt Wagner, Facebook CEO: Company Was Too Slow to Respond to Pelosi Deepfake,
BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-26/facebookceo-company-was-too-slow-to-respond-to-pelosi-deepfake.
45. Id.
46. Kaitlin Curry, Berman Introduces Legislation to Combat Nefarious ‘Deepfakes,’ Protect
Election Integrity, ASMDC (June 24, 2019), https://a24.asmdc.org/press-releases/20190624berman-introduces-legislation-combat-nefarious-deepfakes-protect-election.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office.”51 The right of citizens to inquire, hear, speak about, and use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened selfgovernment.52
Traditionally under a First Amendment analysis, courts first consider
whether a law is aimed at regulating conduct or speech. Additionally, courts
examine whether the law establishes a time, place, or manner restriction or
whether the law attempts to control speech based on content or the speaker’s
viewpoint.53 If the court determines that the restriction is content-based, the
restriction is considered presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict
scrutiny.54 However, the Supreme Court has allowed regulation of certain
categories of content-based restrictions such as obscenity, defamation, fraud,
incitement, fighting words, true threats, speech integral to criminal conduct,
and child pornography.55
Especially in the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court has
stubbornly refused to recognize new categories of unprotected speech. In
fact, the Court has declined to recognize a complete prohibition on false
statements.56 The Court has acknowledged that “some false statements are
inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in public
and private conversation.”57 Defamation or fraud are current legal remedies
that provide potential avenues of relief to false statements. The government
is allowed to regulate false speech in order to protect the public against
consumer deception.58
In United States v. Alvarez, the Court refused to establish a new,
unprotected category for false statements.59 Notably, however, Justice
Breyer signaled a willingness to analyze exactly how well the statute’s
means are tailored towards its ends.60
Justice Breyer specifically
recommended that the Court consider the “seriousness of the speech-related
harm the provision will likely cause, [and] the nature and importance of the
51. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (quoting Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)).
52. Id.
53. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 722 (2000); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz.,
576 U.S. 155, 169 (2015).
54. Reed, 576 U.S. at 164.
55. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S.
323, 344 (1974); see also generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Illinois
ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574; Watts v. United States,
394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498
(1949); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
56. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718–19 (2012) (plurality opinion).
57. Id.
58. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 612.
59. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 718–19.
60. Id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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provision’s countervailing objectives.”61 Furthermore, Justice Breyer
suggested that a proportionality approach, discussed in Part III, would allow
the Court to balance freedom of expression with important governmental
interests.62
Of course, it is possible that political deepfakes may not be limited to a
speech analysis. The primary danger that political deepfakes pose to society
is not the amount of political speech or even the identity of the speaker, but
rather the act of creating and sharing deepfake media is a likely cause of
increased political polarization and threatens the integrity of our democratic
political process. Therefore, using a proportionality analysis, it could be
possible to analyze content-neutral legislation that restricts speech or
inherently expressive conduct under the four-part test set forth in United
States v. O’Brien and intermediate scrutiny.63 The challenged regulation will
be upheld if it falls within “the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”64
B. The Challenges of Regulating Political Deepfakes

Traditionally, the First Amendment freedom of expression has been
fiercely guarded as one of the most important rights conferred by the Bill of
Rights. The reasoning behind this hard line approach is to protect the
integrity of the First Amendment.65 As a result, legislators and the judiciary
alike have been cautious to create exceptions to the First Amendment.66 The
obvious risk is that a multitude of exceptions will lead to a slippery slope
that weakens the First Amendment.67 Even though some landmark Supreme
Court decisions recognize exceptions to the First Amendment freedom of
expression, these exceptions are intentionally and strictly limited to specific
circumstances.68 Especially in modern times, the Supreme Court has been

61. Id.
62. Id. at 731.
63. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
64. Id.
65. John D. Moore, The Closed and Shrinking Frontier of Unprotected Speech, 36 WHITTIER
L. REV. 1, 5 (2014) (discussing the importance of First Amendment protections).
66. Eugene Volokh, Censorship Envy, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/16/censorshipenvy/ (criticizing government restriction on freedom of expression).
67. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003),
https://www2.law.ucla.edu/Volokh/slipperyshorter.pdf (warning of the dangers of excessively
regulating freedom of expression).
68. Symposium: An Ocean Apart? Freedom of Expression in Europe and the United States,
The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917,
932–33 (2009).
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overly hostile to new categories and has declined to extend First Amendment
protection beyond the limits of those few cases.69
Does deepfake technology create new problems that are incapable of
being reconciled with the Constitution? The likely answer is no. American
constitutional law has adapted to confront new technological issues that the
Framers could not have imagined. A robust protection of speech is important
in order to protect the fundamental principle behind the First Amendment:
to encourage the proliferation of discussion and debate that is fundamental
and essential to democracy. Scholars recognize that deepfake videos “could
hijack elections, eroding faith in . . . democracy.”70 In Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, the Court upheld a statute that prohibited
knowingly giving material support, such as expert advice, to foreign terrorist
organizations.71 Although the Court recognized that conduct ordinarily calls
for a lower standard of scrutiny, the statute regulated on the basis of content
and thus triggered a higher standard of scrutiny.72
Like the statute in Holder, a statute controlling the creation and
distribution of a politically-based deepfake video could be analyzed as
regulating creators’ content rather than pure political speech.73 This
distinction is especially important because First Amendment analyses first
inquire as to the type of speech or conduct the government is attempting to
regulate.74 Next, courts must decide what level of scrutiny applies to the
regulation at issue. Generally, a content-neutral regulation would receive
intermediate scrutiny and would be upheld if it advances important
governmental interests not related to the suppression of free speech and it
does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further the
government’s interests.75
One example of an advancement of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
is its ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan (Sullivan), which extended First
Amendment protection to libel upon a showing of actual malice.76 However,
the Court’s holding in Sullivan does not help solve the deeper harm inflicted
by political deepfakes. Sullivan is inapplicable to deepfake regulations for
two reasons. First, Sullivan invalidated an Alabama law intended to protect

69. Symposium: What Swings the Vote? The Influence of the U.S. Legal System and the
Media on Presidential Elections, Note: The Cost of Free Speech: Combating Fake News or
Upholding the First Amendment?, 75 U. MIAMI L. REV. 572, 607–09 (2021).
70. Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, 21st Century-Style Truth Decay: Deep Fakes
and the Challenge for Privacy, Free Expression, and National Security, 78 MD. L. REV. 882, 888
(2019).
71. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 28.
74. Holder, 561 U.S. at 36.
75. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
76. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293.
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public officials from specific sources of libel.77 Second, the creator of
political deepfake content cannot always be identified, which is why state
defamation laws are inadequate solutions for deepfake regulation.78
To satisfy the standard set by Sullivan, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant knew or acted with reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
content in order to prevail.79 However, if the plaintiff cannot identify the
creator of the deepfake content, the plaintiff would only be able to pursue an
action against a third-party host such as a social media platform, which could
be blocked by Section 230 immunity.80 Additionally, it would be difficult
for the plaintiff to prove that the third-party host had actual knowledge of the
malicious intent. Further, it is not clear who or what qualifies as a “public
figure” or “public official.”81
Moreover, plaintiffs in a potential defamation deepfake challenge must
also grapple with the lasting impact of the video and the possibility of never
obtaining relief. It is commonly understood today that once something is
posted on the internet it is unlikely to ever be completely deleted or
destroyed. Whether it be a screenshot, individual download, or private
recording, any media on the internet has the potential to exist forever.

III. Recommendations for Adapting First Amendment Doctrine
A. The Supreme Court Should Adopt a New Categorical Exception for
Political Deepfakes

The Supreme Court should permit the government to regulate
deepfakes that are political in nature by recognizing a new unprotected
category under the First Amendment. Although in recent cases the Court has
declined to establish new unprotected categories, political deepfakes are
distinguishable from other forms of technology because of the unique
destabilizing threat they pose to democracy.
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Court
considered whether a California law that restricted the sale of violent video
games to minors violated the First Amendment.82 The Brown Court
acknowledged its decision in United States v. Stevens, where just the year
before, it held that new categories of unprotected speech could not be
established simply because a legislature identified a certain kind of speech
as harmful.83 In Stevens, the Court struck down a statute that criminalized

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 256.
Reid, supra note 4 at 218.
Hustler Magazine Inc., 485 U.S. at 53.
47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
Hustler Magazine Inc., 485 U.S. at 53.
Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 788–89 (2011).
Id. at 791.
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the sale of depictions of animal cruelty.84 The Court determined that the
regulation of depictions of animal cruelty was a content-based restriction on
speech in violation of the Free Speech Clause.85
The Brown Court found that California’s research from psychologists,
who found that violent videogames had a harmful effect on children, was not
compelling enough to overcome strict scrutiny.86 Notably, the Court
reasoned that the studies failed to show that “violent video
games cause minors to act aggressively.”87 Therefore, the Brown Court
declined to rely on studies that demonstrated correlation, instead of
causation.88 Further, Justice Scalia emphasized that the “new and not
historically recognized categories of noncoverage were highly disfavored,”
so that creating new recognized categories “would require a showing of
necessity resembling the Court’s traditionally highly stringent ‘compelling
interest’ standard.”89
The regulated content in Brown is distinguishable from political
deepfakes because videogames cannot alter elections or affect voter trust.
Further, a law that would regulate the creation, sale, and distribution of
political deepfakes would likely be characterized as content-based core
political speech. Core political speech is one of the most protected categories
under the First Amendment because it is essential for democratic debate.90
As a result, courts apply strict scrutiny to laws that burden political speech
and require the government to show that the restriction “furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”91
The purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the proliferation of
viewpoints that further democracy.92 Although the Court has allowed some
restrictions on speech, these restrictions have been justified in order to permit
the government to operate democratic functions. The Court has reserved
some narrow categories of operations open to regulation because of their
essential democratic function. These democratically-based operations
include public school education, criminal punishment, military duties, and
political service.93 As the Court recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, “it is of
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–70 (2010).
Id.
Brown, 564 U.S. at 800.
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Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1613, 1623 (2015).
90. Senator Marco Rubio, Keynote Remarks at The Heritage Foundation’s Homeland
Security Event on Deep Fakes (July 19, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/homeland-security/event/
deep-fakes-looming-challenge-privacy-democracy-and-national-security.
91. FEC v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007).
92. See United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
93. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (protecting the
“function of public school education”); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Lab. Union, Inc., 433
U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (furthering “the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system”
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particular importance that candidates have the unfettered opportunity to
make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the
candidates’ personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before
choosing among them on election day.”94
As stated above, the Citizens United Court found that the corporate
independent expenditures “would not interfere with governmental functions”
and could not be restricted by the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, contradicting precedent that allowed restrictions when speech
interfered with governmental functions.95 Notably, the Court recognized that
“it is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free to
obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast
their votes.”
Further, the Citizens United Court recognized that
“[c]orporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the
‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the
First Amendment seeks to foster.”96 The Court has recognized political
speech as “indispensable to decision making in a democracy, and this is no
less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an
individual.”97 In First National Bank of Boston. v. Bellotti, the Court noted
that the “inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union, or individual.”98
While the Court has so far rigidly set its First Amendment
jurisprudence, technology will only continue to evolve. The time has come
for the Court to determine a reasonable approach to applying the First
Amendment when the constitutional right of speech conflicts with
democracy. The Court could justify a new unprotected category by citing
what it has already recognized: maintaining the integrity of the political
process. Allowing the regulation of political deepfakes would result in a
more informed political electorate and a fairer electoral process. However,
if the Court declines to establish a new unprotected category, the Court could
instead adopt a proportionality approach that some scholars view as
necessary to balance fundamental constitutional rights.

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (ensuring “the
capacity of the Government to discharge its [military] responsibilities” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557 (1973) (“[F]ederal service
should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service”).
94. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52–53 (1976).
95. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341.
96. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342–43 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783).
97. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
98. Id.
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C. Adopting a Proportionality Approach as an Alternative

Scholars are recognizing that the harmful effects of fake news media
have permeated society and are inflicting damage on democracy.99 For
example, Kareem Gibson analyzes the current remedies available to victims
of targeted deepfake videos.100 Specifically, Gibson addresses torts of
defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress as
applicable causes of action available to plaintiffs.101 Gibson proposes that a
“federal criminal statute would be the best option for plaintiffs seeking to
redress the harms they have suffered.”102 Although Gibson is correct that a
federal criminal statute would send a message to the states that the
government is serious about confronting damaging political deepfakes, the
reality of federal criminalization is unlikely to come to fruition. Congress
has continuously failed to adequately regulate social media platforms.103
Further, such a statute would trigger a tidal wave of litigation because of its
potential effect and chilling of the closely-guarded freedom of expression
within the First Amendment. Gibson’s prediction that intentional infliction
of emotional distress actions will be the best tool to combat deepfakes fails
to consider the lasting challenges that political deepfakes cause to society.
In contrast, privacy and government investigations scholar Shannon
Reid advocates for the Supreme Court to adapt their First Amendment
doctrine to infer stronger privacy protections that exist within the
Constitution.104 Reid recognizes the “threat that deepfakes pose to the
integrity of public discourse itself, in addition to the reputational harm it
causes targeted individuals.”105 At the same time, Reid acknowledges the
Court’s opinion in Brown v. Hartlage where the Court determined that “the
State’s fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the
State with a compelling justification for limiting speech.”106 Reid also
emphasizes the Supreme Court’s willingness to infer a right of personal
privacy in the Constitution.107 Similarly, defamatory deepfakes are generally
nonconsensual and “deprive individuals of their autonomous right to build
their own personality and reputation.”108 Reid proposes that federal courts
99. Terry Lee, The Global Rise of “Fake News” and the Threat to Democratic Elections in
the USA, 22 PUBLIC ADMIN. AND POLICY: AN ASIA-PACIFIC J. 1, 1 (2019) (recognizing that “many
fear ‘fake news’ [has] gradually become a powerful and sinister force, both in the news media
environment as well as in the fair and free elections”).
100. Kareem Gibson, Deepfakes and Involuntary Pornography: Can Our Current Legal
Framework Address This Technology?, 66 WAYNE L. REV. 259, 261 (2020).
101. Id. at 262.
102. Id. at 288.
103. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).
104. Reid, supra note 4, at 228.
105. Id. at 228–29.
106. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982).
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should infer a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy in order to protect
against the personal privacy and reputational harms caused by political
deepfakes.109 However, because it is unlikely that the Court will recognize
that the Fourteenth Amendment extends to private conduct, Reid offers an
alternative approach that balances constitutional freedoms.110 While this
proportionality proposal is intriguing, it has not been widely practiced.111
For example, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, the Court refused to balance constitutional freedoms of speech
and religion and instead determined the holding on a technicality.112
Also an advocate of the proportionality approach, Jamal Greene
presents two frameworks for the traditional constitutional adjudication of
rights in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.113 The first framework,
adopted by the Supreme Court, Greene presents constitutional rights as
absolute with limited exceptions. The second framework embraced by the
rest of the world characterizes rights as generally limited, but absolute in
certain circumstances.114 Greene argues that proportionality, rather than
categorical adjudication, is more helpful when confronting modern
challenges such as technological advancements.115 Greene presents a
proportionality analysis as a solution to modern constitutional conflicts, such
as those related to technological advancements, because the increasing
number of categorical exceptions result in incoherence and confusion.116
However, recent First Amendment cases show the trend of stubbornness and
reflects that an adoption of a proportionality analysis is highly unlikely.
Nonetheless, Greene provides the example of Justice Breyer signaling his
willingness to embrace a transition to a proportionality analysis in cases such
as United States v. Alvarez and Craig v. Boren.117
Another scholar Brittany Finnegan analyzed a hypothetical statute
regulating social media and outlined the Court’s awareness of evolving
technologies and necessary constitutional adaptations. From there, Finnegan
concluded that the government’s unwillingness to regulate harmful conduct
now will result in an unfortunate inability to regulate what is exchanged
online in the future.118 Finnegan outlined the Court’s awareness of evolving
109. Id.
110. Reid, supra note 4, at 235.
111. Id.; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018).
112. Reid, supra note 4, at 235.
113. Greene, supra note 17, at 30.
114. Id. at 30.
115. Id. at 35.
116. Id. at 120.
117. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 730–31 (Breyer, J., concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–
12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
118. Brittany Finnegan, Note, The Cost of Free Speech: Combating Fake News or Upholding
the First Amendment?, 75 U. MIAMI L. REV. 572, 618 (2021).
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technologies and necessary constitutional adaptations. In Packingham v.
North Carolina, the Court warned that they could not yet fully appreciate the
“full dimensions and vast potential” of the “Cyber Age.”119 However, Justice
Alito warned that the Court did not “hee[d] its own admonition of caution”
regarding the regulation of social media.120 Regulation of speech on social
media platforms has become a polarizing issue that signals the need to adapt
the First Amendment doctrine. As technology advances, Congress and the
Supreme Court must decide how to reconcile fundamental constitutional
freedoms.

Conclusion
The principal purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the
proliferation of viewpoints that further democracy.121 However, the
government has compelling interests both in furthering democratic debate
and maintaining the integrity of an essential government function: the
electoral process. Although the Court has allowed some restrictions on
speech, these restrictions have been justified in order to permit the
government to operate democratic functions.122 The Court has reserved
some narrow categories of operations open to regulation because of their
essential democratic function. The NDAA may allow the DHS to collect
evidence of manipulated media affecting elections. Perhaps the Court would
be willing to establish a new, unprotected category based on evidence that
reveals a causal, rather than correlative, relationship between the regulation
and the threat to society. Although any law that attempts to regulate political
speech, including The For the People Act, would be likely subject to strict
scrutiny, it is possible that the government may have enough to show its
compelling interest in preventing voter misinformation that skews elections.
Technological evolution is inevitable and the First Amendment doctrine
must change in order to adapt to the current times. Political deepfakes are
an extreme example of altered media that is used to manipulate the minds of
the political electorate and election results. The Supreme Court should adopt
a new, unprotected category in order to allow government regulation of
political deepfakes. Although freedom of expression is one of the most
protected rights in American constitutional law, the Court must act now to

119. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736.
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121. See Playboy Ent. Grp, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813.
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establish an unprotected category or prioritize democratic interests to protect
the foundation of American democracy.

